Fairness
Do seats track votes closely enough that large blocs are not over-rewarded and smaller blocs are not shut out?
A better way to think about Westminster elections
Votes pile up where they change nothing. Parties obsess over a handful of marginals. Voters are pushed to choose tactically instead of honestly. That is not just bad luck. It is a ballot-design problem.
This site starts with that glitch, then works outward: why it happens, what a simpler ballot could do, and which reform paths make the most sense for the UK.
The odd thing about First Past the Post (FPTP) is that it can make perfectly normal voter behaviour produce weird results. You can end up with millions of wasted votes, giant seat bonuses for one party, safe seats where almost nobody gets campaigned to, and constant pressure to vote against the side you fear rather than for the side you actually like.
Those are not four separate problems. They are four symptoms of the same design choice: a ballot that lets each voter make just one mark in a multi-party democracy.
In 2024, nearly 15 million votes had no impact on the result. If you live in a safe seat, your vote effectively does not count.
Labour won 63% of seats with just 34% of votes. Reform UK got 14% of votes but only 0.8% of seats. This is not democracy.
Millions vote against their true preference to "stop the other side". Voters should vote for who they want, not against who they fear.
Most constituencies never change hands. Parties focus all resources on marginal seats while ignoring everyone else.
Data from the 2024 General Election. For more on these issues, see Make Votes Matter and the Electoral Reform Society.
Why this site exists
First Past the Post is increasingly hard to defend. The party system is fragmenting. Labour knows that its historic 2024 seat haul came from just a third of the vote β and that the same arithmetic could work against it next time. Reform UK, which built its base partly on a promise of proportional representation, could become a major force in Westminster. The conditions for a serious reform conversation are assembling, whether or not any party plans to start one.
When that conversation arrives β through a commission, a manifesto commitment, or sheer political necessity β the options on the table will matter enormously. And that is where Britain has a problem.
Every serious UK attempt at electoral reform has been shaped β and often derailed β by the specific political circumstances of its moment. The Jenkins Commission proposed a mixed system that satisfied almost no one. The 2011 AV referendum asked the public to adopt a system that even many reformers considered a compromise, and the campaign for it collapsed under the weight of unfamiliarity and a brutal opposition effort.
The lesson is not that reform is impossible. It is that the choice of system matters as much as the political will to change. A reform proposal that is hard to explain, hard to count, or easy to caricature will struggle β no matter how theoretically sound it is.
This site argues that Britain's reform debate has underexplored a family of voting systems built around a radically simple ballot change: instead of marking one candidate, you approve every candidate you would be happy to elect.
That single change β from "pick one" to "approve as many as you like" β unlocks a set of reform options that range from the smallest possible improvement to Westminster (single-winner approval in existing constituencies) to a fully proportional Parliament (multi-member approval districts). And crucially, at every point on that spectrum, the ballot stays simple.
Criteria for reform
Once you see the glitch, the obvious next question is: what should a better system actually do? A good reform has to clear a few tests at once. It should make seats fairer, give voters more real power, preserve a workable local link, stay legible on the ballot, and fit the politics of how reform could actually happen in the UK.
Do seats track votes closely enough that large blocs are not over-rewarded and smaller blocs are not shut out?
Can voters back people they genuinely support, and can elected representatives still be held to account by identifiable electorates?
Does the system preserve a credible constituency or regional link, using boundaries people can recognise and work with?
Can ordinary voters understand the ballot and can administrators count the result without opaque transfer rules?
Could the UK actually legislate and run it, either as a near-term reform or as a clear next stage after proportionality is won?
If you already follow electoral reform, you will know some of these names. If you do not, here is a quick orientation. The UK is not starting from scratch. Several proportional systems are already used for elections in different parts of the country, and reformers have been debating them for decades.
This site is aimed at both audiences: people encountering proportional representation for the first time, and people who already know the main options but want to ask whether the ballot itself could be simpler.
What it is: voters rank candidates in order of preference in multi-member districts. As candidates are elected or eliminated, lower preferences transfer to remaining candidates.
Where it is used: Northern Ireland (Assembly, local elections), Scottish local elections, Republic of Ireland (all elections).
Main strength: proportional results without closed party lists β voters choose individual candidates, not just parties.
Main tradeoff: ranking many candidates can be demanding, and the transfer count is harder to follow than a simple tally.
What it is: voters get two votes β one for a local constituency MP (elected like FPTP), and one for a party. Extra "top-up" seats are then allocated from party lists to make the overall result more proportional.
Where it is used: Scottish Parliament, Welsh Senedd (until 2026), London Assembly. Also used in Germany and New Zealand.
Main strength: keeps a named local MP while adding proportionality through the second tier.
Main tradeoff: the local vote is still FPTP, which means the tactical squeeze and vote-splitting survive in the constituency tier.
What it is: voters choose a party (and sometimes a preferred candidate within that party's list). Seats are allocated to parties in proportion to their vote share.
Where it is used: was used for European Parliament elections in Great Britain; being adopted for the Welsh Senedd from 2026. Also used across Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and many other countries.
Main strength: the most direct route to proportional seat shares.
Main tradeoff: with closed lists, party officials choose who gets elected. Open lists (as in Finland) fix this, but the system still shifts more power to party-level competition.
These are all serious, well-tested systems. This site does not dismiss them. It asks a further question: given that the ballot is where the voter meets the system, could the ballot itself be made simpler and more expressive? That is what the next sections explore.
Once you move beyond FPTP, the next question is not just how proportional you want the result to be. It is also what you are asking voters to do on the ballot. STV, AMS/MMP, and open-list systems are all serious reform options. But they each make a different choice about how voters express support, and that choice shapes how simple, legible, and forgiving the system feels in practice.
STV elects multiple candidates per constituency, ensuring proportional representation. It's used successfully in Ireland, Scotland (local elections), and Northern Ireland.
That does not make STV a bad system. It does mean reformers should weigh real costs:
An STV-style ballot asks you to rank candidates in order:
MMP uses party lists to ensure overall proportional representation. It's used in Germany, New Zealand, and (as AMS) in Scotland and Wales.
Standard AMS/MMP often keeps a single-choice constituency contest, which means:
The important point here is simple: proportionality matters, but the ballot interface matters too.
So before asking which proportional family is best, it helps to ask a more basic question: what if the ballot simply let voters support every acceptable candidate? That is the idea we introduce in the next section.
The other big choice
Once you know what the ballot should let voters say, the next question is how many seats each district should elect. That choice changes almost everything: local connection, proportionality, ballot length, and how much geography has to move around.
This is why multi-member districts matter. They are not a voting method by themselves. They are a structural ingredient that several methods can share.
One area elects one MP.
One area elects several MPs.
Local seats plus regional balancing seats.
STV and Proportional Approval are different because they use different ballots and counting rules. But they both rely on the same structural idea: districts that elect more than one person.
AMS+ is different again. It keeps single-member constituencies for local seats, then adds a second proportional layer on top. So the district question is separate from the ballot question β and the site needs to explain both.
And one more layer
Once you know the ballot and the district shape, you still need a rule for turning votes into winners. This is the bit most people only encounter as a method name: plurality, transfers, top-up seats, or reweighting.
The simplest rule: whoever has the most support wins. Used in FPTP and single-winner approval.
Used in STV. Ballots move around as candidates are elected or eliminated, which helps proportionality but makes the count harder to follow.
Used in AMS/MMP. Local winners are combined with regional balancing seats so the final chamber better matches party support.
Used in proportional approval systems. Once one of your approved candidates wins, your ballot carries a little less weight for the next seat so other groups can win representation too.
Now that the pieces are on the table, the named systems are easier to read. Each one combines a ballot type, a district structure, and a way of allocating seats. The question is not which brand name sounds nicest. It is which combination best fits Westminster.
| System | Family | Fairness | Local link | Ballot | Counting | UK reform path |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| STV | Candidate-centred PR | High in sensible district magnitudes | Multi-member local districts | Rank candidates | Transfer count; slower to explain and verify | Established PR option; needs district redesign |
| AMS / MMP | Mixed-member PR | High if top-up share is adequate | Single-member seats plus regional members | Usually one local candidate vote plus one party vote | Moderate; familiar in devolved UK politics | Near-term Westminster PR route because UK voters already know the structure |
| Open-list PR | List PR | High | Regional rather than single-constituency | Vote for a party and optionally candidates on that list | Straightforward with stable district magnitudes | Practical if reformers want simple proportionality first |
| Single-Winner Approval | Approval-based majoritarian | Better local legitimacy, but not proportional nationwide | Keeps one MP per constituency | Approve any acceptable candidates | Very simple; just total approvals | Smallest possible Westminster ballot reform and easiest to legislate quickly |
| AMS+ | Approval-based mixed PR | High, with stronger local voter choice | Keeps constituency MPs plus regional correction | Approve local candidates; choose a party list | Simpler local count than standard AMS | Most coalition-ready approval reform because it builds directly on AMS/MMP |
| Proportional Approval | Approval-based multi-member PR | Very high | Regional or multi-member district link | Approve acceptable candidates | Reweighting is simpler than STV transfers, but still new to Westminster | Longer-term end-state once multi-member district design is politically live |
Deeper dive
If you want to understand STV or fully proportional approval systems, you eventually have to ask a geography question: how big should districts be, and what happens as they get bigger?
That is what the visualiser is for. It lets you group todayβs Westminster constituencies into larger districts and see how district size changes proportionality, local scale, and ballot pressure.
Use the live tool to see how grouped districts change the map and why district size matters.
Open visualiserThe point of this site is not to declare a winner. It is to make sure that when Britain next seriously considers electoral reform, the options on the table include approval-based systems β not because they are perfect, but because they have been overlooked and they deserve honest evaluation alongside STV, AMS, and list PR.
If you think that matters, the most useful things you can do are practical:
The main UK campaign for proportional representation. They are building the coalition that makes reform politically unavoidable.
Research, events, and the institutional memory of a century of reform advocacy. A good place to understand the landscape.
Ask them to support a serious commission on electoral reform β one that evaluates a genuinely wide range of systems, including approval-based options.
The US organisation behind real-world approval voting campaigns. Their research and implementation experience is directly relevant.